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NO WARRANT FOR RADICAL CHANGE:
A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSORS GEORGE AND GUTHRIE
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY†
INTRODUCTION
Professors George and Guthrie have written a provocative
1
article proposing radical changes to the Supreme Court. They
propose increasing the size of the Supreme Court from nine to fifteen
Justices to increase the Court’s capacity. Of course, there is nothing
sacrosanct about nine as the number of Justices. The size of the Court
has varied from five to ten Justices over the course of American
history. But there have been nine Justices ever since 1869, and a
2
change after almost 150 years is would appear quite dramatic.
Even more significantly, Professors George and Guthrie propose
having the Supreme Court hear cases in panels with the opportunity
for en banc review in extraordinary cases. This would be
unprecedented in the United States. There occasionally have been
proposals for this type of change, but not for a long time and not with
3
any serious chance of adoption.
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† Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of
Law. I am grateful to the Duke Law Journal, and especially its Editor-in-Chief, Jeff
Chemerinsky, for inviting me to participate in this Symposium. I have never been part of a
Symposium that was more enjoyable or more special to me than this one.
1. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the
Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439 (2009).
2. Also, the intense controversy over the last effort to change the size of the Supreme
Court—President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan in the 1930s—likely has discouraged
consideration of changing the size of the Supreme Court. For a discussion of Roosevelt’s
proposal and the controversy surrounding it, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 255–56 (3d ed. 2006).
3. Professors George and Guthrie mention that this was proposed in 1869 and 1880.
George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1460. There is no indication that in either instance this had a
serious chance of adoption.
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Professors George and Guthrie are correct in their premise that
it is always desirable to rethink institutional design and that the
4
Supreme Court largely has been immune from this type of scrutiny.
Yet change—and especially radical change—requires a compelling
justification, a belief that no less drastic alternative would suffice, and
a conviction that the reform would be desirable. I do not believe that
Professors George and Guthrie’s proposal meets these requirements.
In this Response, I thus address three questions in evaluating
their proposal. First, have Professors George and Guthrie shown a
problem that requires a solution? Second, if so, are there other ways
to solve this problem that are less drastic? Third, would such a change
be desirable? Finally, I conclude by offering some cautionary
thoughts about empirical studies of judging behavior, especially when
mere statistical descriptions form the basis for unjustified normative
conclusions.
I. IS THERE A PROBLEM?
The premise for the proposal by Professors George and Guthrie
is that the Supreme Court’s docket has shrunk dramatically. They are
correct both in terms of the actual number of cases decided—235 in
1930, 170 in 1945, 161 in 1985, and 67 in 2007—and in the percentage
5
of petitions for certiorari that are granted. The harder question is
assessing how much this is a problem.
From the perspective of a lawyer who has had a number of
seemingly meritorious petitions for certiorari denied, I find the
decreased docket troubling. It is, by any measure, a great deal more
difficult to get the Court to hear a case, even a case with a circuit split.
From the perspective of a casebook author who has to prepare annual
6
supplements, the longer opinions that have resulted from the smaller
docket are very problematic. As the number of cases has gone down,
the length of the opinions has gone up. Slip opinions are often over

4. A notable exception to this a 2006 proposal to limit the terms of Supreme Court
Justices. See generally REFORMING THE COURT (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds.,
2006) (debating the desirability of tenure reform for Supreme Court Justices and exploring
strategies to achieve term limits).
5. George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1441.
6. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2005); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2008).
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150 pages long. There is no way to edit an opinion that long into an
assignment manageable for students in one night without making a
hash of it. I have come to favor word and page limits being imposed
on Supreme Court opinions.
On the other hand, as I talk to judges and lawyers who practice
in specialized areas, like bankruptcy and tax law, I hear praise for the
smaller docket. From their perspective, the fewer Supreme Court
decisions in their field the better, as the Court lacks expertise in these
areas and its rulings are often perceived as engendering more
confusion than clarity.
My instinct is the same as Professors George and Guthrie’s that a
larger docket would be desirable. But it is impossible to assess
whether the smaller docket poses serious problems or how large a
docket would be needed to make a difference. The impossibility of
knowing how many more cases the Court would hear if it sat in panels
as opposed to always being en banc complicates this assessment. In
fact, Professors George and Guthrie emphasize that they are saying
only that their proposal “could” increase the size of the docket, not
8
that it would.
Professors George and Guthrie offer three primary advantages
to their proposal and consequentially to a larger docket. First, they
argue that the larger docket that would result from the Court acting
in panels would decrease the conflicts among the federal circuits and
the states. As they note, a primary function of Supreme Court review
is to resolve these disagreements and thus to create uniform federal
9
law.
This justification falls short because Professors George and
Guthrie provide no basis for assessing whether the size of the docket
is a serious problem in terms of the splits that exist in the lower
courts. They offer no information as to the number of conflicts in
decisions that exist, how long they last, or the extent to which their

7. For example, the slip opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1, No. 05-908 (U.S. June 28, 2007), was 176 pages long, not counting the
appendices.
8. Professors George and Guthrie write, “We intentionally say ‘could’ rather than
‘would’ . . . . First, the Court’s docket is almost entirely plenary, and the Justices therefore
would not be required to hear more cases than they currently hear. The dynamics of the
certiorari process would influence the decision.” George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1460 n.94.
9. Supreme Court Rule 10(a) identifies a split among the lower courts as a ground for
granting certiorari.
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proposal would decrease conflicts. They are correct that conflicts in
the interpretation of federal law are undesirable, but neither they nor
any of the sources they cite provide any indication of the extent of the
10
problem or how much using panels of Justices would solve this. Nor
is it easy to measure the number of circuit splits or their duration.
There is actually nothing but intuition that the problem has increased
over time or that a larger docket would make much of a difference.
The Court’s reasons for choosing to not take more cases presenting a
split are complex, and the Court might continue to refuse to do so
even if it had the capacity for a larger docket.
Second, Professors George and Guthrie argue that increasing the
size of the Supreme Court’s docket would lead to more error
correction. They write: “[I]f the Court decided more cases, it would
11
undoubtedly correct more errors committed by lower courts.”
But to speak of “errors” is to beg enormously difficult questions
of how to assess what is “correct” as opposed to “erroneous.” Just
because the Supreme Court reverses a federal court of appeals or a
state’s highest court does not mean that the Supreme Court is right
and the lower court is wrong. In the 2006 Term, twenty-four of the
sixty-eight cases decided by the Supreme Court were resolved by a 5–
4 margin. It surely cannot be said that the five in the majority were
correct whereas the four dissenters were in error. Even if the
Supreme Court is unanimous in reversing a lower court, it does not
mean that the lower court decision was erroneous. Unless one simply
assumes that the Supreme Court is always right, it is impossible to
believe that more decisions means more error correction.
Moreover, even if one began with such an untenable assumption,
increasing the size of the docket through using panels would not
provide much more in the way of error correction. Professors George
and Guthrie acknowledge this when they write,
We of course are not asserting that the Supreme Court’s primary
function is as a court of error correction. A single institution, even
with panels, could not correct error in the more than 30,000 cases

10. Professors George and Guthrie discuss this at George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1448–
49. None of the sources in the footnotes on those pages discuss this.
11. Id. at 1447.

CHEMERINSKY IN MACRO

2009]

5/5/2009 4:21:25 PM

NO WARRANT FOR RADICAL CHANGE

1695

decided on the merits by the federal courts of appeals and the many
12
more issued by state high courts.

Third, Professors George and Guthrie argue that the larger
13
Supreme Court docket would increase “checks and balances.” They
point to more than two thousand federal laws and almost a half
14
million pages in the Federal Register during the Bush presidency.
They say that “[i]f the Court’s decisionmaking capacities expanded, it
could play a much more prominent role in policing the actions of the
15
other branches.”
But here Professors George and Guthrie assume that federal
judicial review requires Supreme Court review. Even though the
Supreme Court may hear relatively few cases, the lower federal courts
are available to hear challenges to federal statutes or regulations and
to decide any cases that pose questions of interpretation or validity.
The number of federal laws and regulations says nothing about the
need for Supreme Court review. Professors George and Guthrie offer
no examples or evidence that the smaller docket is limiting the
adequacy of checks and balances.
The overall problem with Professor George and Guthrie’s
argument is that they fail to present any way for assessing what is the
ideal size of the Supreme Court’s docket. They have the intuition that
a larger docket would be better, but offer neither a way to assess this
claim nor any way for determining what the docket ideally should be.
Without this analysis, it is simply impossible to determine whether
having the Court sit in panels, and the increase in the docket that
would result from it, is desirable.
II. ARE THERE LESS DRASTIC ALTERNATIVES?
By any measure, Professors George and Guthrie argue for
dramatic changes in the Supreme Court’s institutional structure: the
first change in its size in nearly 150 years, making it two-thirds larger,
and having it sit in panels for the first time in American history. Thus,
it is reasonable to ask whether there are other, less radical ways to
achieve the goal of increasing the size of the docket.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 1447 n.38.
Id. at 1451–52.
Id.
Id. at 1452.
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There are many other ways to increase the number of cases
decided by the Supreme Court each year. First, the Court can simply
choose, on its own, to hear more cases. There has been a great deal of
discussion in recent years about the Court’s shrinking docket, and
perhaps not coincidentally this year the Court has taken more cases.
It is likely that there will be about eighty-five cases during October
Term 2008, a third more than the sixty-seven cases decided the year
before. Some Justices have said that they believe that a larger docket
16
would be desirable. The Court can easily solve the problem of the
dwindling docket by taking more cases each year.
Second, Congress can expand the mandatory jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court by statute. At the beginning of American history, the
Supreme Court’s docket was entirely mandatory. Over the course of
American history, Congress has made even more of the Court’s
17
docket discretionary. The most recent change occurred in 1988,
when Congress made the Court’s entire appellate jurisdiction
discretionary except for review of decisions by three-judge federal
district courts. The decrease in the size of the docket is, in part,
because of the elimination of almost all mandatory jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court.
Congress could remedy this by mandating that the Supreme
Court hear appeals in certain kinds of cases. Professors George and
Guthrie suggest one possible way to achieve this: increase the use of
18
certification of cases to the Supreme Court. Professors George and
Guthrie suggest that the Supreme Court take more certified cases.
Congress could create mandatory jurisdiction in these cases. The
desirability of this is uncertain. Courts of appeals have no way of
assessing the relative priority of cases on the Supreme Court’s docket
or what case is the better vehicle for addressing a particular issue. My
point is not to argue for greater mandatory jurisdiction, but rather, to
suggest that it is a much less drastic way to increase the Court’s
docket than having it decide cases in panels.

16. Professors George and Guthrie point out that Chief Justice Roberts said exactly this at
his confirmation hearings. Id. at 1447. I also have heard Justices Breyer and Alito say this in
comments at judicial conferences.
17. For a description of these changes, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 672–73 (5th ed. 2007).
18. George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1450–51.
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Third, other institutional structures could be developed to
resolve splits among the circuits. In the 1970s, there were proposals
for creating a new national court of appeals between the United
19
States Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals. The
primary justification offered for these proposals was to decrease
20
unresolved splits among the circuits. This proposal, too, would be
quite dramatic in establishing a new court and a new level of court,
but because it would leave the Supreme Court untouched, it would
not be perceived by the public or most lawyers as nearly as radical a
21
change as that proposed by Professors George and Guthrie.
These suggestions are not exhaustive of the ways that the Court’s
docket might be expanded. But they do indicate that there are many
ways to achieve the goal without expanding the Court or having it sit
in panels.
III. WOULD THE PROPOSAL BY PROFESSORS GEORGE AND
GUTHRIE BE DESIRABLE?
Even assuming that their proposal would achieve the benefits
they identify, it still may carry significant, detrimental consequences. I
have no sense as to whether fifteen rather than nine Justices would be
better. As Professors George and Guthrie acknowledge, the number
of Justices is inherently an arbitrary choice. They acknowledge, “We
do not know how to calculate an ‘optimal’ number of Supreme Court
22
Justices . . . .”
From the perspective of a lawyer who has argued several cases in
the Supreme Court, I confess to worrying about what it would be like
to face a bench of fifteen rather than nine. But I also know no way of

19. See, e.g., Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 208–47 (1975).
20. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 680–81.
21. The proposals for a new national court of appeals were tremendously controversial,
and sitting and former Supreme Court Justices spoke out against them. See, e.g., Justice Brennan
Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal “Fundamentally Unnecessary and Ill Advised,” 59
A.B.A. J. 835, 836–38 (1973) (defending the screening function of the Supreme Court as its most
important function and an essential feature of the Court); Earl Warren, Let’s Not Weaken the
Supreme Court, 60 A.B.A. J. 677, 678–80 (1974) (arguing that a delegation of the Supreme
Court’s powers would weaken the Court, politicize the judiciary, and actually add to the Court’s
workload).
22. George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1456.
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determining whether fifteen Justices would be overall better or worse
than nine.
I, however, believe, however, that having the Supreme Court sit
in panels rather than en banc would be very undesirable. A decision
of a panel of Supreme Court Justices never will have the same
legitimacy as a decision by the whole Court. Losing litigants and the
public always will be left to wonder whether the result would have
been different if only the luck of the draw had produced a different
panel to hear the case.
When I hear of a person arguing a case in a federal court of
appeals, my first question always is, “Who is your panel?” When I
argue a case in a federal court of appeals that reveals the panel’s
composition in advance—the Ninth Circuit announces the panel a
week before oral argument—I learn the identity of my panel as soon
as I can. When I argue a case in a federal court of appeals that does
not announce the panel until the day of the argument, like the Fourth
Circuit, the first thing I do upon arriving at the court house is rush to
the clerk’s office and learn my panel. This, is common behavior
among appellate lawyers.
I, and everyone, make judgments about the likely outcome based
on the identity of the panel. Rarely has my prediction ever been
wrong. In the summer of 2008, I argued a civil rights case in the Ninth
Circuit that involved the death of three Latino teenagers as a result of
a police officer mistakenly shooting at a moving car. I knew that I had
little chance of winning when I saw that my panel was three very
conservative judges. A friend who is a very experienced attorney,
upon hearing of the panel, suggested that I let my ten-year-old
daughter argue the case; that her chance of prevailing was no less
than mine. After the oral argument, which went poorly, I told my
friend that I should have let my daughter argue; the argument could
not have gone worse for my side, she had a better chance of charming
them, and when they were mean, she could have gotten away with
kicking them in their shins. (I lost two weeks later in a two-page
unpublished opinion.)
I do not think that it would be desirable to have outcomes in the
Supreme Court depend on the identity of the panel or be perceived as
being a result of the luck of the draw. This inherently would lessen
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the legitimacy and credibility of Supreme Court decisions.
Professors George and Guthrie respond to this by arguing that in only
a small percentage of cases would the outcome be different with
24
panels. First, in the cases that are 5–4—and remember that in
October Term 2006 of sixty-eight cases, twenty-four were decided by
25
a 5–4 margin —the outcome really would depend on the accident of
the panel. Second, and more importantly, lawyers and the public
would understandably perceive that the result was the product of who
was selected for the panel. Statistics showing that overall most cases
would likely have come out the same with the full Court never would
eliminate the sense in many cases that the result was the product of
the panel.
The panel’s decision would not have the same authority or
legitimacy as decisions by the entire Court. The loss of legitimacy
would be greatest at the beginning as lower courts, lawyers,
academics, and the public became accustomed to panel decisions. But
the loss of legitimacy would not simply be short-term; panel decisions
never would have the credibility or legitimacy of decisions of the full
Court.
Professors George and Guthrie address this problem briefly at
26
the end of their article. They assert that legitimacy is not a problem
because the courts of appeals and foreign courts have legitimacy even
27
though they sit in panels. But the problem with this argument is that
it treats legitimacy as binary, as either existing or not existing. Of
course, that is not correct. Legitimacy, however defined and
measured, is surely a continuum. The relevant question is whether
courts that sit in panels have the same legitimacy as courts that sit en
banc. Put more precisely, the issue is whether sitting in panels would
substantially decrease the Court’s legitimacy. Asserting that courts of
appeals and foreign courts have legitimacy does not answer that

23. Many have written about the importance of the Court’s credibility and institutional
legitimacy. See generally, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d
ed. 1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s prudential values serve as limitations that protect
the Court’s legitimacy).
24. George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1464.
25. SCOTUSBlog, October Term 2006: Summary Information Regarding the Term,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/OT06SummaryInfo.pdf (last visited Feb. 20,
2009).
26. George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1472.
27. Id.
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concern. There is no way to know whether these courts that sit in
panels would have even more legitimacy if they sat en banc. Also, the
authors fail to recognize the loss of legitimacy in shifting from a Court
that for over two hundred years acted only en banc to one that sits in
panels.
Professors George and Guthrie offer another solution: the
possibility of en banc review by the Supreme Court. But they find
themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, if en banc review were
rare and limited, then it could not solve the loss of legitimacy that
would result from the vast majority of cases being decided by panels.
On the other hand, if en banc review were frequent, then increasing
the size of the Court and having panels would achieve little increase
in the size of the docket and none of the benefits claimed by
28
Professors George and Guthrie.
CONCLUSION
This Symposium includes many wonderful papers on empirical
research about judicial behavior. All describe aspects of how courts
actually operate. But a cautionary note is necessary; there is a need to
always carefully separate discussions of what “is” from what “ought
to be.” Descriptions, even with the most sophisticated techniques, do
not provide normative conclusions (though they can be the basis for
normative analysis). Things can be measured—the size of the docket,
the number of cases decided, the rate of agreement among judges,
citation counts—but that does not necessarily mean that these
measurements reveal anything useful and the descriptions are not
normative in themselves.
Yet it is so easy for the descriptive to slip into the normative. The
paper by Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner, published in this
29
Symposium, illustrates this point. They rank state court judges using
three criteria—opinions produced, rate of disagreement with other
judges of their party, and citation count. They label these counts

28. The very existence of the en banc procedure would take additional Court time and
limit the additional capacity to hear more cases. It has to be assumed that litigants losing before
a panel would frequently petition for en banc review. Scrutinizing these petitions would take
time as would the en banc hearings and opinions. The more en banc proceedings there would
be, the less there would be capacity for a larger docket.
29. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information
Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313 (2009).
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“productivity,” “independence,” and “influence.” These terms have
enormous normative content far beyond just calling the measures
“opinions produced,” “rate of disagreement with judges of the same
political party,” and “citation count.” Every judge wants to be
deemed productive, independent, and influential.
Yet Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner never defend their
assessment in normative terms. Why should the number of opinions
produced be seen as a measure of productivity rather than a function
of the size of the docket and the norms for that court? A conservative
Democrat or a liberal Republican might vote consistently differently
from others of the same party, but why does that make the person
more independent? Why assume a citation is necessarily the same as
influence?
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner then rank the state courts
and even individual judges using these measures. We are used to
rankings in everything from football polls to U.S. News & World
Report. Rankings take on a life of their own and are seen as a
measure of quality. In other words, they take statistics, attach
normative labels, and do rankings, sliding from descriptions to
normative conclusions and never justify doing so.
Empirical research about judging can be enormously valuable if
it provides important insights into courts and judicial behavior. But
empirical research can do great harm if it is assumed that something
matters just because it can be measured and if it is allowed to
substitute for careful normative analysis and arguments.

